Dari 8 pos pertahanan Inggris, 6 di antaranya tidak ada masalah, hanya di dua tempat, yakni di Gedung Lindeteves dan Gedung Internatio yang masih ada permasalahan/tembak-menembak.
Setelah berhasil mengatasi kesulitan di Gedung Lindeteves, rombongan
Indonesia-Inggris segera menuju Gedung Internatio, pos pertahanan
Inggris terakhir yang bermasalah. Ketika rombongan tiba di lokasi
tersebut, nampak bahwa gedung tersebut dikepung oleh ratusan pemuda.
Setelah meliwati Jembatan Merah, tujuh kendaraan memasuki area dan
berhenti di depan gedung. Para pemimpin Indonesia segera ke luar
kendaraan dan meneriakkan kepada massa, supaya menghentikan
tembak-menembak.
Kapten Shaw, Mohammad Mangundiprojo dan T.D. Kundan ditugaskan masuk ke
gedung untuk menyampaikan kepada tentara Inggris yang bertahan di dalam
gedung, hasil perundingan antara Inggris dengan Indonesia. Mallaby ada
di dalam mobil yang diparkir di depan Gedung Internatio. Beberapa saat
setelah rombongan masuk, terlihat T.D. Kundan bergegas keluar dari
gedung, dan tak lama kemudian, terdengar bunyi tembakan dari arah
gedung. Tembakan ini langsung dibalas oleh pihak Indonesia.
Tembak-menembak berlangsung sekitar dua jam. Setelah tembak-menembak
dapat dihentikan, terlihat mobil Mallaby hancur dan Mallaby sendiri
ditemukan telah tewas.
Ada dua kejadian pada tanggal 30 Oktober 1945, yang pada waktu itu
dilemparkan oleh Inggris ke pihak Indonesia, sebagai yang bertanggung
jawab, dan kemudian dijadikan alasan Mansergh untuk “menghukum para
ekstremis” dengan mengeluarkan ultimatum tanggal 9 November 1945:
- Orang-orang Indonesia memulai penembakan, dan dengan demikian telah melanggar gencatan senjata (truce),
- Orang-orang Indonesia membunuh Brigadier Mallaby.
Tewasnya Mallaby memang sangat kontroversial, tetapi mengenai siapa yang
memulai menembak, di kemudian hari cukup jelas. Kesaksian tersebut
justru datangnya dari pihak Inggris. Ini berdasarkan keterangan beberapa
perwira Inggris yang diberikan kepada beberapa pihak.
Yang paling menarik adalah yang disampaikan kepada Tom Driberg, seorang
Anggota Parlemen Inggris dari Partai Buruh (Labour). Pada 20 Februari
1946, dalam perdebatan di Parlemen (House of Commons) Tom Driberg,
menyampaikan:
“….. some of the press reports from Indonesia have been entirely responsible. In particular, I have learned from officers who have recently returned that some of the stories which have been told, not only in the newspaper, but, I am sorry to say, from the Government Front Bench in his House, have been very far from accurate and have innecessarily imparted prejudice and concerns the lamented death of Brigadier Mallaby. That was announced to us as a foul murder, and we accepted it as such. I have learned from officers who were present when it happened the exact details and it is perfectly clear that Brigadier Mallaby was not murdered but was honourably killed in action……. The incident was somewhat confused –as such incidents are- but it took place in and near Union Square in Surabaya. There had been discussions about a truce earlier in the day. A large crowd of Indonesians –a mob if you like- had gathered in the square and were in a rather excited state.
About 20 Indians, in a building on the other side of the square, had been cut off from telephonic communication and did not know about the truce. They were firing sporadically on the mob. Brigadier Mallaby came out from the discussions, walked straight into the crowd, with great courage, and shouted to the Indians to cease fire. They obeyed him. Possibly half an hour later, the mob in the square became turbulent again. Brigadier Mallaby, at a certain point in the proceedings, ordered the Indians to open fire again. They opened fire with two Bren Guns and the mob dispersed and went to cover; then fighting broke out again in good earnest. It is apparent that when Brigadier Mallaby gave the order to open fire again, the truce was in fact broken, at any rate locally. Twenty minutes to half an hour after that, he was unfortunately killed in his car –although it is not absolutely certain whether he was killed by Indonesians who were approaching his car; which exploded simultaneously with the attack on him.
I do not think this amounts to charge of foul murder …..because my information came absolutely at first hand from a British officer who was actually on the spot at the moment, whose bona fides I have no reason to question…..”
Di sini Tom Driberg meragukan, bahwa Mallaby terbunuh oleh orang Indonesia. Dia menyatakan:
“….it is not absolutely certain whether he was killed by Indonesians who were approaching his car; which exploded simultaneously with the attack on him.”
Selanjutnya dia juga membantah, bahwa tewasnya Mallaby akibat “dibunuh
secara licik” (foully murdered). Kelihatannya pihak pimpinan tentara
Inggris -untuk membangkitkan/memperkuat rasa antipati terhadap
Indonesia- rela mendegradasi kematian seorang perwira tinggi menjadi
“dibunuh secara licik” daripada menyatakan “killed in action” –tewas
dalam pertempuran- yang menjadi kehormatan bagi setiap prajurit.
Juga penuturan Venu K. Gopal, waktu itu berpangkat Mayor, yang adalah
Komandan Kompi D, Batalion 6, Mahratta. Kompi D ini mengambil tempat
pertahanan di Gedung Internatio. Tanggal 8 Agustus 1974, dia menulis
kepada J.G.A. Parrot antara lain :
“Let me first give you some background. “D” Coy had been under fire off and on and had already casualties. The firing came from other buildings on the square and by and large we were able to contain it. We could, however, see that armed men barred all the exits from the square.
Meanwhile armed Indonesians swarmed over to the veranda of the building and I had to bluntly tell them that I would fire if they started pressing into the building. By this time I could not see Brigade Mallaby or the LOs (Liaison Officers) because of the crowds on the veranda.
Just then Capt. Shaw and Kundan ( I did not know their names at that time) tried to get into the building but were prevented. Kundan then shouted to the crowd that he would get us surrender and he and Capt.Shaw were then allowed to go into the building if they took an Indonesian officer with them. I allowed them in hoping to play for time. After a little time Kundan went out of the building, leaving Capt. Shaw and the Indonesian Officer behind.
Soon thereafter the armed men started pushing in and I was left with no option but to open fire. The Decision was mine and mine alone. Capt. Smith is correct when he says that BM (Mallaby-pen.) did not give any orders to Capt. Shaw..”
Dengan pengakuan Mayor Gopal, Komandan Kompi D yang bertahan di Gedung
Internatio, sekarang terbukti, bahwa yang memulai menembak adalah pihak
Inggris; tetapi kelihatannya dia masih ingin melindungi bekas atasannya
dengan menggarisbawahi, bahwa perintah menembak tersebut adalah
keputusannya sendiri. Ini jelas bertentangan dengan kesaksian T.D.
Kundan, yang diperkuat dengan kesaksian seorang perwira Inggris melalui
Tom Driberg.
Dengan pengakuan ini terlihat jelas, bahwa Inggris pada waktu itu
memutar balikkan fakta dan menuduh bahwa gencatan senjata telah
dilanggar pihak Indonesia (the truce which had been broken). Di dalam
situasi tegang bunyi ledakan ataupun tembakan akan menimbulkan kepanikan
pada kelompok-kelompok yang masih diliputi suasana tempur, sehingga
tembakan tersebut segera dibalas; maka pertempuran di seputar Gedung
Internatio pun pecah lagi.
Dari pengakuan kedua perwira Inggris tersebut telah jelas, bahwa pemicu
terjadinya tembak-menembak adalah pihak Inggris sendiri. Dugaan ini
sebenarnya tepat, bila disimak jalan pikiran Mallaby, seperti dituliskan
oleh Capt. Smith:
“…He (Mallaby, red.) did not believe in the safe-conducts in so far as it applied to us, but thought that some at least of the Company might get away. Accordingly Capt. Shaw was sent into the building to give the necessary orders…..”
Sebelum itu, menurut Smith, telah terjadi perbedaan pendapat antara
Kapten Shaw dan Mallaby mengenai permintaan para pemuda Indonesia, agar
tentara Inggris meninggalkan persenjataan mereka di dalam gedung.
Awalnya, Kapten Shaw menyetujui permintaan ini, tetapi Mallaby kemudian
membatalkannya. Smith :
“…Eventually, the mob demanded that the troops in the building laid (sic) down their arms and marched (sic) out: they and us (sic) guaranteed a safeconduct back to the air field. The Brigadier flatly refused to consider this proposal. After further pressure, however, Capt.Shaw, who was well known to some of the indonesians through his job as FSO, and who had been a considerable strain since our arrival in Surabaya, agreed to the terms on his own responsibility. The Brigadier at once countemanded this………”
Uraian Tom Driberg di Parlemen Inggris (House of Commons) kelihatannya keterangannya diperoleh dari Kapten Shaw.
Kemudian tuduhan kedua, bahwa orang Indonesia “secara licik membunuh
Mallaby”, perlu diteliti lebih lanjut. Di pihak Indonesia banyak orang
mengaku bahwa dialah yang menembak Mallaby. Hj. Lukitaningsih I.
Rajamin-Supandhan mencatat, ada sekitar 12 orang yang mengaku sebagai
yang menembak Mallaby. Namun menurut penilaian beberapa pelaku sejarah,
dari sejumlah keterangan yang diberikan, cerita yang benar kemungkinan
besar yang disampaikan oleh Abdul Azis. (Lihat: Barlan Setiadijaya, 10
November 1945…., hlm. 429-435.) Dul Arnowo mencatat laporan seorang
saksi mata, Ali Harun, yang kemudian diteruskan ke Presiden Sukarno.
Surat tersebut dibawa oleh Kolonel dr. W. Hutagalung ke Jakarta, dan
diserahkan langsung kepada Presiden Sukarno pada tanggal 8 November
1945.
Dari berbagai penuturan, memang benar adanya penembakan dengan
menggunakan pistol oleh seorang pemuda Indonesia ke arah Mallaby, tetapi
tidak ada seorang pun yang dapat memastikan, bahwa Mallaby memang tewas
akibat tembakan tersebut. Yang menarik untuk dicermati adalah pengakuan
Kapten R.C. Smith dari Batalyon 6, Resimen Mahratta, yang pada waktu
itu menjabat sebagai Liaison Officer Brigade 49. Tanggal 31 Oktober, dia
memberikan laporannya yang pertama, kemudian pada bulan Februari,
sehubungan dengan keterangan Tom Driberg di House of Commons. Laporan
Smith dimuat oleh J.G.A. Parrot, dalam analisisnya, Who Killed Brigadier
Mallaby? Kapten R.C. Smith menulis:
“The Report by Capt. R.C. Smith.
At approximately 1230 hrs. on 30th October, Capt T.L. Laughland and I were ordered by Col. L.H.O.Pugh, DSO, 2i/c (Second in Command) of the Bde., to proceed to the Government offices, where we were each to collect an Indonesian representative. From there one of us was to go north, and the other south, through the town, and try to persuade the mobs to go back to their barracks. Brigadier Mallaby was at this time in conference with the Governor in the Government Offices.
On arrival there, we were told by the Brigadier that the Indonesians had refused to treat with anyone except him. Accordingly we set off with the Brigadier and the FSO (Field Security Officer), Capt. Shaw, plus the leaders of the various parties, in several cars, the foremost of which was flying the white flag.
The first place to which we went was a large building about 150 yards west of the Kali Mas River, which runs north and south through the town. One Coy of the 6 Mahrattas had been having a very stiff fight in this building against about five hundred Indonesians, and had been in considerable difficulties.
On our arrival there, the mob was collected round the cars, and the various party leaders made speeches to them, in an attempt to persuade them to return to their barracks. The speeches were at first quite well received, and the necessary promises given.
We then got into our cars and set off for the next position. We had only gone about 100 yards when we were stopped by the mob aproximately 20 yards from the Kali Mas. From then on the situation rapidly deteriorated. The mob leaders began to incite the mob, and the party leaders gradually lost control. The mob, which up to that time had seemed fairly friendly towards us, became distinctly menacing: swords were waved, and pistols pointed at us and we were left with very little doubt as to their intentions.
Eventually, the mob demanded that the troops in the building laid (sic) down their arms and marched (sic) out: they and us (sic) guaranteed a safe-conduct back to the air field. The Brigadier flatly refused to consider this proposal. After further pressure, however, Capt.Shaw, who was well known to some of the indonesians through his job as FSO, and who had been under a considerable strain since our arrival in Surabaya, agreed to the terms on his own responsibility. The Brigadier at once countemanded this: on further consideration, he decided that the company had been in so bad a position before, that any further fighting would lead to their being wiped out.
He did not believe in the safe-conduct in so far as it applied to us, but thought that some at least of the company might get away. Accordingly Capt. Shaw was sent into the building to give the necessary orders.
The rest of us were disarmed – except for a grenade which Capt. Laughland managed to keep concealed – and made to sit in one of the cars.
The Brigadier was on the side nearest to the Kali Mas, Capt. Laughland in the middle, and myself on the outside nearest to the building in which our troops were.
When Capt. Shaw got into the building, the Indonesians brought up a machine gun to cover the entrance. He and the company commander decided that any attempt to walk out unarmed would lead to a massacre and so the order to open fire was given.
As soon as the firing started, the three of us who were in the car crouched down on the floor as far as possible. An Indonesian came up to the Brigadier’s window with a rifle. He fired four shots at three of us, all of which missed. He went away while we shammed dead. The battle went on for about two and a half hours, to about 2030 hrs, by which time it was dark. At the end of that time, the firing died down to some extent, and we could hear shouting as though the Indonesians were being collected. Two of them came up to the car and attempted to drive it away. That failed and one of them opened the back door on the Brigadier’s side. The Brigadier moved, and as they saw from that, that he was still alive, he spoke to them and asked to be taken to one of the party leaders. The two Indonesians went away to discuss this, and one of them came back to the front door on the Brigadier’s side. The Brigadier spoke to him again, the Indonesian answered, and then suddenly reached his hand in through the front window, and shot the Brigadier. It took from fifteen seconds to half-a-minute for the Brigadier to die, but from the noise he made at the end, there was absolutely no doubt that he was dead. (Notes from Parrot: This was the first time that these details of the final moments of Brigadier Mallaby had been made public. In this second report Smith offered the following explanation:”In the report made by Capt.Laughland and myself the following morning we stated that the Brigadier was killed instantly. This was done in order to spare the feelings of the family.”)
As soon as he had fired, the Indonesian ducked down beside the car, and remained there until after the Brigadier was dead. I took the pin out of the grenade which Capt.Laughland had previously passed to me, and waited. The Indonesian appeared again, and fired another shot which grazed Capt. Laughland’s shoulder. I let go the lever of the grenade, held it for two seconds to make sure it was not returned and threw it out of the open door by Brigadier’s body. As soon as it had exploded, Capt. Laughland and I went out of the door on my side of the car, waited for a short time, then ran around the car and dived into the Kali Mas. As the two Indonesians by the side of the car did not attemp to interfere with us it is presumed that they were killed by the grenade—which also set the back seat of the car on fire. After five hours in the Kali Mas, we managed to reach our troops in the Dock area.”
Keterangan Smith ini a.l. menguatkan penjelasan Gopal, bahwa memang
benar pihak Inggris yang memulai penembakan. Kesaksian Smith ini mirip
dengan keterangan Abdul Azis; dan ternyata dia tidak mati seperti dugaan
Smith.
Sehubungan dengan penembakan dengan senapan yang terjadi sebelum
penembakan terhadap Mallaby, dalam surat kepada Parrot tertanggal 23
November 1973, Smith menulis antara lain:
“I have no idea what hapenned to the four shots from the rifleman. He
approached the car from the left (the Brigadiers side) with the rifle at
the ready, and looking at the three of us. I am not ashamed to say at
this point I shut my eyes and started counting the shots!
I think all three of us were equally surprised at finding both ourselves and the others alive afterwards!”
Tentu sangat luar biasa, bahwa menembak tiga orang yang sedang duduk di
dalam mobil yang sempit dengan empat tembakan, namun tak satupun yang
mengena. Hal ini menunjukkan, bahwa dapat dipastikan, pemilik senapan
itu baru pertama kali menembak, sehingga menembak tiga orang dengan
jarak mungkin paling tinggi 2 meter, empat tembakan meleset semua.
Mengenai ciri-ciri penembak Mallaby, dalam surat kepada Parrot tanggal 20 Februari 1974, Smith menulis:
“… the indonesian who killed the Brigadier was a young lad around 16 or 17 approximately, but it was too dark to see whether he was wearing any sort of uniform. The weapon was an automatic pistol …”
Kemudian pada 20 Februari 1974, Smith menulis kepada Parrot yang isinya antara lain:
“I have no recollection of the conversation that the Indian interpreter reported and while I certainly could not state that I heard everything that happenned, I think I should have remembered this, if not now after 30 years, certainly at the time when I wrote my report. However, in all fairness, I must say that there were moments when my attention was distracted from the Brigadier myself. For instance, I can remember spending some time trying to convince a very angry young Indonesian that I had not personally be responsible for his brother’s death.
Going back to my report, the position of all of us was very closely gouped around one car so that there was only a matter of a very few feet between us. Therefore, Brigadier Mallaby was certainly able to hear when Captain Shaw agreed to the demands of the mob, which was why he was able to countermand it immediately. As I said, he then changed his mind in the hope that some of the men at least might reach safety, but the orders that he gave Captain Shaw were that the troops in the building should lay down their arms and come out unarmed, in the hope of safe-conduct.
I definitely did not hear any suggestion that they should be ordered to open fire after a certain length of time had elapsed. The one thing that has always been quite firmly established in my memory is that the orders to fire were given by Captain Shaw once he had got into the building.”
Yang perlu diragukan di sini adalah dugaan Smith, bahwa Mallaby tewas
sebagai akibat tembakan pistol pemuda Indonesia. Seperti dalam
tulisannya, dia mengatakan bahwa pada saat itu sekitar pukul 20.30 dan
keadaan gelap. Memang aliran listrik di daerah tersebut telah diputus
oleh pihak Indonesia.
Dia hanya mengatakan:
“…berdasarkan suara yang didengar dari arah Mallaby, dia yakin bahwa
Mallaby telah tewas 15 – 30 detik setelah ditembak dengan pistol…”
Selain itu dia juga mengakui, bahwa granat yang dilemparkannya melewati
tubuh Mallaby telah mengakibatkan terbakarnya jok belakang mobil mereka,
artinya tempat Mallaby duduk.
Menurut pemeriksaan di rumah sakit, jenazah Mallaby sangat sulit
dikenali, karena hangus dan hancur. Dia dikenali melalui tanda bekas jam
tangan di kedua lengannya, karena Mallaby dikenal dengan kebiasaannya
untuk memakai dua jam tangan; jadi bukan identifikasi wajah atau
ciri-ciri tubuh lain. Hal ini disampaikan oleh dr. Sugiri, kepada
Kolonel dr. W. Hutagalung.
Seandainya keterangan Smith benar, bahwa Mallaby tidak memberikan
perintah untuk memulai menembak, bahkan sebaliknya, yaitu
menginstruksikan Kapten Shaw untuk memerintahkan tentara Inggris yang di
dalam gedung agar mereka meletakkan senjata dan ke luar gedung tanpa
senjata, maka telah terjadi pembangkangan yang berakibat fatal, yaitu
perintah dari komandan kompi, Mayor Gopal, untuk memulai menembak.
Dilihat dari sudut mana pun, timbulnya tembak-menembak yang berakibat
tewasnya Mallaby, adalah kesalahan tentara Inggris.
Mengenai tuduhan bahwa Mallaby tewas akibat tembakan pistol, sangat
diragukan. Jelas untuk membela diri, Smith dan Laughland harus
menyatakan dahulu bahwa Mallaby telah tewas ketika Smith melemparkan
granat, yang kemudian justru membakar bagian belakang mobil yang mereka
dan Mallaby tumpangi. Beberapa saksi mata di pihak Indonesia mengatakan
bahwa mobil Mallaby meledak akibat granat tersebut sehingga dengan
demikian, boleh dikatakan Mallaby tewas karena kesalahan pihak Inggris
sendiri. Dari kronologi kejadian dapat disimpulkan, bahwa Mallaby tewas
karena tembak-menembak berkobar lagi.
Yang sangat menarik untuk dicermati sehubungan dengan pelemparan granat
oleh Kapten Smith, adalah kesaksian Imam Sutrisno Trisnaningprojo,
seorang pemuda berpangkat kapten, mantan anggota PETA. Trisnaningprojo
ikut dalam iring-iringan mobil dalam rangka penyebarluasan hasil
kesepakatan Sukarno-Hawthorn. Bahwa Smith adalah orang yang melemparkan
granat yang mengakibatkan mobil yang ditumpangi Mallaby terbakar, diakui
oleh Smith sendiri, tetapi Trisnaningprodjo menuturkan, bahwa Smith
tidak berada di dalam mobil bersama Mallaby, melainkan bersama Laughland
di luar mobil ketika terjadi penembakan terhadap Mallaby.
Trisnaningprojo melihat, Smith berada di dekat gedung dan melemparkan
granat ke arah pemuda yang menembak Mallaby, tetapi granat meledak di
sebelah mobil Mallaby yang pintu belakangnya terbuka. Jadi, Captain
Smith melempar granat tidak dari dalam mobil, melainkan dari luar mobil.
Ini berarti bahwa tidak ada yang mengetahui kondisi Mallaby setelah
penembakan dari pemuda Indonesia tersebut, apakah terluka atau memang
telah tewas seperti penuturan Smith.
Baik dari kesaksian Smith, maupun keterangan Trisnaningprojo yang
dilengkapi sketsa lokasi pada saat kejadian, pemuda Indonesia menembak
dengan pistol ke arah Mallaby melalui jendela depan di sisi kiri mobil,
sedangkan Mallaby –masih menurut Smith- duduk di jok belakang, di sisi
paling kiri. Dari posisi pemuda Indonesia tersebut, walaupun dia
menggunakan tangan kiri, kemungkinan besar bagian tubuh Mallaby sebelah
kanan yang akan terkena tembakan, dan ini biasanya tidak mematikan.
Berbeda, apabila yang terkena adalah tubuh bagian kiri, di bagian
jantung.
Di samping itu, juga tidak ada yang bisa memastikan, bahwa tembakan
pemuda tersebut benar mengenai sasaran karena sebelumnya -juga menurut
Smith- ketika bertiga masih duduk di bagian belakang mobil, ada yang
menembak ke arah mereka dengan senapan sebanyak empat kali, namun tak
satu peluru pun yang mengenai mereka. Tidak tertutup kemungkinan, bahwa
pemuda yang menembak dengan pistol, juga baru pertama kali memegang
pistol, sehingga belum mahir menggunakannya.
Ketika diwawancarai oleh Ben Anderson pada tanggal 13 Agustus 1962, Dul
Arnowo menyatakan, bahwa dia yakin Mallaby secara tidak sengaja, telah
terbunuh oleh anak buahnya sendiri.
Dalam laporan rahasia kepada atasannya, Kolonel Laurens van der Post
mantan Gubernur Militer Inggris di Batavia/Jakarta tahun 1945,
menuliskan (Sir Laurens van der Post, The Admiral’s Baby, John Murray,
London, 1996):
“The detail of what happenned at Sourabaya is not really relevant to this review but it is interresting that the very latest evidence suggests that the Mallaby Murder, far from being premiditatet or a deliberate breach of faith, was caused more by the indescribable confusion and nervous excitement of everyone in the town. Had General Hawthorn, the General Officer Commanding Java at the same time, had proper Civil Affairs and political officers on his staff to draft his unfortunate proclamations for him and to keep [in] continuous and informed contact with population, the story of Sourabaya may well have been different."
- http://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peristiwa_10_November
- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tom_Driberg
- http://nusantarahistory.com/2012/10/30/general-mansergh-the-actor-behind-surabaya-battle-2/
- http://maskolis.blogspot.nl
Written By maskolis